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In this article a number of approaches toward ecstasy or ecstatic spirit possession are explored that 
take a decisively non-sociological approach to the subject. They stress the importance of acknowl-
edging ecstasy and related phenomena not as by-products of social struggle but as actual experi-
ences that are events with meaning and importance in the biographies of those who experience 
them. Some of these are psychological theories (exemplified by Abraham Maslow), some are theo-
logical (Teresa of Ávila), and some stand in between (Martin Buber). These psycho-theological 
theories contribute to understanding ecstasy and have to be taken into account. Emphasised at the 
end of the article is the need to reconcile these views with the seemingly contradictory theories of 
ecstasy such as that of Lewis.
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In the preface to the second edition of his Ecstatic Religion1, Ioan Myrddin Lewis 
answers the criticism that his sociological theory ultimately draws on psychological 
reasons to explain spirit possession. His answer – that psychological and sociological 
issues are always and intrinsically intertwined and that therefore the sociological fal-
lacy (according to Durkheim) does not apply to him – is in my opinion satisfactory. 
One might add that psychological explanations vice versa ultimately refer to social 
matters. But in Lewis’s theory sociological factors serve as the predominant fea-
tures of explanation, just as there are other theories that put their primary emphasis 
on the psychology of ecstasy.
1 I.M. Lewis, Ecstatic Religion. A Study of Shamanism and Spirit Possession, London 1989.
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In my previous article2 I argued that Lewis’s theory of ecstasy, though highly valu-
able and endowed with high explanatory power, falls short in being able to explain 
some instances (one might say categories) of ecstasy. In his paradigm ecstatic spirit-
possession is always used to improve or protect material or social status. Therefore it 
can be defined as a “means of fighting for material goods and social power between 
social agents (e.g. classes, sexes)”3. Even though this actually often proves true, it 
cannot explain all those instances of ecstasy in the history (or present) of religions 
where ecstatics do not strive for more power or goods, but often do not show much 
interest for both possessions or higher regard. It also falls short of explaining how it 
is the case that in many non-hierarchical and non-exploitative social settings ecstatic 
spirit-possession prevails in some form or another. But most important perhaps is the 
fact that Lewis’s paradigm generally interprets ecstatic spirit-possession as a direct 
or indirect form of aggression, whereas ecstasy is often described as an experience of 
abundant love, beauty and bliss for which an aggressive mind-set, and therefore an 
act of aggression, is not likely to follow, but the contrary.
Even though Lewis makes repeatedly assurances that the actual act of possession 
is a question that the social anthropologist cannot decide on, his statements such as 
those that Somali women’s argumentative strategies against the allegation of fraud-
possession by their husbands are an “ingenious sophistry”4 prove him wrong. In fact, 
the trajectory of his argumentation as a whole leads to the denial of the possibility 
of the authenticity of ecstasy at all by reducing all of them to by-products of what 
really matters: power. This contradicts theories that take ecstasy (or ecstatic spirit 
possession) seriously as a psychological state. In the following pages three of these 
approaches will be explored and their claims explained. They take ecstasy as a latent 
possibility that can be actualised and often leads to profound individual transforma-
tion. The article ends with highlighting the contradictions of these approaches to 
Lewis’s sociological theory and the need for an interpretative framework that recon-
ciles them. 
Martin Buber’s refutation of sociological approaches to ecstasy
In 1910, at the first meeting of the Deutscher Soziologentag (“German Sociologists’ 
Day”) Martin Buber responded to a presentation by Ernst Troeltsch that provided 
a typology of the sociological categories of church, sect, and mysticism. The last of 
these can be understand as one of the major cultural frameworks in which ecstasy ap-
pears in the history of religions. Buber commented on that lecture with the objection 
that mysticism is actually not a fait social, but quite the opposite: 
2 M. Deecke, A Critical Assessment of Lewis’s Sociological Theory of Ecstasy. Towards an Integra-
tive Model for Theorising Ecstasy, “Studia Religiologica” 2012, No. 45 (4), p. 283–292. 
3 Ibidem, p. 289.
4 I.M. Lewis, op.cit., p. 68.
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[I would like] to pose the question as to the extent to which (...) mysticism is a sociological cat-
egory at all. For I would like to affirm that it is not such a category, that it is solely a psychologi-
cal category (...). I believe mysticism is best qualified as religious solipsism. On the one hand 
it is the most complete realisation of that type of religiosity which is a form of self-awareness 
and intensity of self-maximising that enables an ‘apperception of God’, a personal relationship 
to a content of the soul that is perceived as God. 
It (...) seems to me on the other hand that it is very far from religion as a sociological entity 
resting on religiosity. To me it seems more adequate that mysticism is negating all society, not 
fighting it, not opposing against it, as a sect would do, but negating it, and mainly because there 
is only one real relationship for the individual here, the relationship to God. Thus, the process 
Professor Troeltsch was referring to, the act of believers getting together so that all their lines 
converge in God, actually does not take place, but in fact each and every believer in his belief 
stays isolated, and communicates with nothing but with his God. It can be conceded that mysti-
cism frequently associates with sociological structures. (...) But it must be emphasised that all 
this is nothing but product of such association5. 
Though I find the definition of mysticism as “religious solipsism” problematic, 
Buber makes a valid point, for ecstasy does have a psychological side that is ex-
tremely important for it. But Buber, unlike Lewis, is not referring to ulterior (or in-
ferior) motifs such as manipulating others, gaining influence etc., but arguing that 
spiritual mysticism is a genuinely psychological category, and emphasising the ec-
static experience itself. In another book Buber points out that in some cultural cir-
cumstances these experiences are most likely not to be expressed publicly, but to take 
a quite different, more silent way of manifesting themselves6, therefore not leaving 
a possibility for manipulation or instrumentalisation.
While some people value in Buber the erudite scholar of religions, others regard 
him “as a gifted native informant rather than a social scientist!”7. Be that as it may, 
for many years there has been an important and widely recognised tradition of the 
psychological enquiry of ecstasy as part of the psychology of religion and beyond, 
of which Buber is only one, and not the most prominent, proponent. These traditions 
5 Translation M.D.; see: P. Mendes-Flohr, Nachwort [in:] M. Buber, Ekstatische Konfessionen, Hei-
delberg 1984, p. 241–260, p. 247–248: “[Ich möchte] die Frage aufwerfen, inwiefern (...) die Mystik 
überhaupt eine soziologische Kategorie ist. Ich möchte nämlich behaupten, daß sie keine solche, daß 
sie lediglich eine psychologische Kategorie ist (...). Ich glaube, die Mystik darf als religiöser Solipsimus 
bezeichnet werden. Sie ist auf der einen Seite wohl die absoluteste Verwirklichung der Religiosität als 
jener Eigenart der Selbstwahrnehmung und jener Intensität der Selbststeigerung, die eine ‘Apperzepti-
on Gottes’, die Stiftung eines persönlichen Verhältnisses zu einem als Gott empfundenen Seeleninhalt 
ermöglicht. Sie (...) scheint mir aber andererseits sehr weit entfernt zu sein von der Religion als einem 
auf der Religiosität aufgebauten soziologischen Ganzen. Es scheint mir, daß die Mystik vielmehr alle 
Gemeinschaft negiert, nicht etwa bekämpft, nicht sich ihr gegenüberstellt, wie die Sekte, sondern sie 
negiert, und zwar deshalb, weil es für sie nur eine reale Beziehung gibt, die Beziehung des Einzelnen zu 
Gott, weil also hier jener Vorgang, den Professor Troeltsch andeutete, das Zusammentreffen der Gläu-
bigen, von denen alle Linien zu Gott führen, gar nicht stattfindet, sondern jeder Gläubige hier in seiner 
Gläubigkeit durchaus isoliert bleibt und es mit nichts anderem zu tun hat als mit seinem Gott. Nun muß 
natürlich zugegeben werden, daß sich die Mystik sehr häufig mit soziologischen Strukturen verbindet. 
(...) Aber das sind alles, das muß betont werden, bloß Verbindungsprodukte”.
6 Cf. M. Buber, Ekstatische Konfessionen, Leipzig 1921, p. 9.
7 V. Turner, Liminality and Communitas [in:] V. Turner, The Ritual Process. Structure and Anti- 
-Structure, New Brunswick–London 2011, p. 94–130, 126.
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have with good reasons emphasised the reality of the subjective, personal experience 
of ecstasy, thus recognising it as an altered state of consciousness, which can ulti-
mately not be reduced to sociological, economical or other matters. William James, 
for example, in The Varieties of Religious Experience, emphasised that extraordinary 
altered states must be taken into account if one wishes to understand many religious 
phenomena, and no theory of the universe would be complete without considering 
these experiences8. These states cannot be dismissed hastily as imaginary, fantasti-
cal, mythological, irrational, and so on, but the cases must be evaluated individually. 
Not being religious himself, in his work James maintained an open mind towards his 
objects of research, as good science always requires9. 
Abraham Maslow’s understanding of the term “peak-experience”
Another influential, but somewhat more modern psychological approach to ecstasy 
was provided by Abraham Maslow10, who coined the term peak-experience (Buber 
too spoke of ecstasy as the “summit” or “peak of existence”, Gipfel des Daseins11). 
For one of the pioneers of the humanistic psychology of the 1950s and ‘60s peak-
experiences (including ecstasy) are highly valuable events in human life that help in 
generating meaning, health, and happiness. They are the crowns of the development 
of a human being that grows to its full potential. Maslow believes that when con-
sciously aspired and continuously trained these peak-experiences lose their ephem-
eral nature and become more steady states (plateau-experiences12). He emphasises 
the positive, growth-generating, health-promoting side of ecstatic states.
His conclusions: Far from being regressive and merely a result of compensation, peak-expe-
riences [such as ecstasy, M.D.] enable a perception that is free of fear and needs, in which the 
cosmos and fellow human beings are conceived as valuable and death and pain are more easily 
accepted. They are accompanied by self-realisation, sometimes have therapeutic effects, and 
enhance religious conversions13.
These evidence-based conclusions are very valuable themselves, but it must not 
be forgotten that ecstasy seems (notwithstanding the fact that it is often desired and 
has beneficial effects) to be intrinsically connected with quite contrary experiences 
such as extensive fear, alienation, depersonalisation (Angstekstase, “ecstasy of fear”). 
Even though Maslow first assumed that only few individuals have had peak-expe-
riences, he later came to understand that these are in fact quite common. When stimu-
8 W. James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, Rockville, Maryland 2008, p. 283.
9 Even if that meant that he had to boost his openness by experimenting with the psychotropic drug 
nitrous-oxide – see W. James, Subjective Effects of Nitrous Oxide Mind, “Mind” 1882, No. 7; R. Gerrig, 
P. Zimbardo, Psychologie, München 2008, p. 183.
10 A. Maslow, Religions, Values, and Peak-Experiences, New York 1994.
11 Ch. Schütz, Verborgenheit Gottes. Martin Bubers Werk – eine Gesamtdarstellung, Zürich – Ein-
siedeln – Köln 1976, p. 108.
12 A. Maslow, op.cit., p. XIV. 
13 B. Grom, Religionspsychologie, München 2007, p. 203 [translation – M.D.]
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lated with the right trigger (in so-called rhapsodic or isomorphic communication14), 
most individuals that have previously denied them can actually recall their own peak-
experiences and even re-experience them. According to Maslow, peak-experiences in 
fact belong to the regular development of a strong and healthy individual. If they do 
not occur at all something has gone wrong15. 
Maslow gives a list of 25 characteristics and effects that can come with peak- 
-experiences16. The most important are: to comprehend the universe as an integrat-
ed, unified Whole; a feeling of independence from the “outer” world, and therefore 
greater objectivity; transcending the ego; they “can make life worthwhile by their oc-
casional occurrence” by giving “meaning to life itself”17; they are valuable in them-
selves and not means to another end; they can contain “experiencing universality 
and eternity”18; the world is experienced as exclusively beautiful, good, and worth 
living; they are a way “of becoming godlike”19, understood in such a way that at-
tributes that were formerly given to an external God are realised inwardly by hu-
man beings themselves; they are often accompanied with a changed attitude toward 
death, since the experience itself resembles experiences of death20; they lead to less 
fear and sometimes bring therapeutic benefits with them; in consequence “heaven” 
is not understood as a geographical place, but as a state that is potentially accessible 
at all times and all places; the self-identity is strengthened, one becomes “more a real 
person”, more responsible, more active; “unitive consciousness” shines through the 
secular appearance of the world and is experienced as holy. 
Teresa of Avila’s descriptions of ecstasy and its effects
“[T]he expert of experts in describing such conditions”21 as ecstasy is Teresa of Avila. 
In her Castillo Interior she describes seven different stages of inner development, 
whereof the first three belong to the ordinary, “natural” realm, and the subsequent 
four are characterised as “supernatural” (cosas sobranaturales). These can usually 
be only accessed by those who have had substantial training and preparation for long 
periods of time22. She undertakes the difficult task of phenomenologically describing 
these states with Christian vocabulary, mainly that of 16th-century Spanish Catholi-
14 A. Maslow, op.cit., p. 84–90.
15 Ibidem, p. 32.
16 Ibidem, p. 59–68.
17 Ibidem, p. 62.
18 Ibidem, p. 63.
19 Ibidem, p. 64.
20 “Ecstasy is somehow close to death-experience, at least in the simple, empirical sense that death 
is often mentioned during reports of peaks, sweet death that is. (...) Experiencing a kind of ‘sweet death’ 
may remove its frightening aspect”. A. Maslow, op.cit., p. 76.
21 W. James, The Varieties of Religious Experience..., p. 299.
22 Teresa de Ávila, Obras Completas, Madrid 1994, p. 869 ff.
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cism. Teresa is self-reflective about the use of her language, and often indicates if 
a descriptive phrase is intended as description, picture or metaphor. 
The Oración de Recogimiento23 (“Prayer of Recollection”) is characteristic of the 
developments from the fourth castle onward, and can lead to a restructuring and 
strengthening of the personality. It brings about greater inwardness, independence 
and autonomy of the personality. When the Prayer of Recollection is being experi-
enced regularly, it leads to profound changes in the identity. 
Because she [the soul, M.D.] has already tasted the joys of God, she understands that those of 
the world are rubbish. She withdraws herself more and more from them and gains more control 
over herself. In short, she grows in all virtues and she will continue to grow (...) But this is not to 
be understood that those effects stay with the soul if God has given this mercy once or twice to 
her and she does not continue to receive them, because perseverance is bringing us all the good24. 
In her Autobiography Teresa relates how important her ecstatic or visionary expe-
riences were for the development she has undergone, and how this affected the major 
decisions in her life25. These “joys” are to be taken literally here as actual inner expe-
riences that profoundly differ from the intensity and depth of experiences of ordinary 
everyday life. There is a qualitative breach that separates them from what most peo-
ple usually experience. She describes them in the language and style she feels most 
comfortable in: narrative accounts, theological vocabulary, or poetic tropes. Yet this 
does not make it likely that they are a fictional accounts (let alone being intended to 
be seen as such): Teresa’s integrity and honesty urge us to understand them as truly 
extraordinary, yet real self-experiences. She differentiates between different kinds of 
experiences with words such as impetus, arrobamiento, arrebatamiento, suspensión, 
and rapto. The most famous of her descriptions is most likely the account of the 
transverberatio, an ecstatic vision of an angel that repeatedly pierced her heart with 
a flaming arrow so that there was 
(...) such great pain that it made me moan, and at the same time this pain caused such excessive 
sweetness that one would never want to miss it nor be content with anything less than God from 
now on. It is not a bodily pain, but a spiritual even though the body in some way participates in 
it. It is such a sweet caressing between the soul and God that I pray to him in his mercy to make 
anybody feel it who says that I am lying26. 
23 Ibidem, p. 880 ff.
24 “(...) como ha probado ya los gustos de Dios, ve que es una basura los del mundo, vase poco a poco 
apartando de ellos y es más señora de sí para hacerlo. En fin, en todas las virtudes queda mejorada y no 
dejará de ir creciendo (...) Tampoco se entiende que de una vez o dos que Dios haga esta merced a un alma 
quedan todas estas hechas si no va perseverando en recibirlas, que en esta perservancia está todo nuestro 
bien”. Ibidem, p. 885 [translation – M.D.].
25 Ibidem, p. 3 ff.
26 “Era tan grande el dolor, que me hacía dar aquellos quejidos, y tan excesiva la suavidad que 
me pone este grandísimo dolor, que non hay desear que se quite ni se contenta el alma con menos que 
Dios. No es dolor corporal, sino espiritual, aunque no deja de participar el cuerpo algo, y aun harto. Es 
un requiebro tan suave que pasa entre el alma y Dios, que suplico yo a su bondad lo dé a gustar a quien 
pensare que miento”. Ibidem, p. 196.
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From the numerous spots where she talks about the effects of experiences like 
this, here are just a few: when those or other “gustos” are granted “the soul” develops 
the desire to suffer if a service can thus be rendered to God, but if this is not the case 
she will no longer agonise about it as she would have done earlier27. She loses her fear 
of death28 and ceases to care about her honour and reputation29. She gains the freedom 
to commit mortal sins, even if not from committing venial sins30. She would prefer to 
stay alone by herself, but if not she would only want to do things that help others31. 
Of some experiences she writes that they happen “so often that it becomes so normal 
that it can be observed and scrutinised”32. There are many examples of extensive and 
detailed descriptions of altered states of consciousness and the positive or sometimes 
dangerous side-effects they can bring about in many of Teresa’s works. Here it is 
crucial to note that though the cultural backgrounds differ greatly there are many 
parallels and distinctive similarities with Maslow’s theory of ecstasy, especially in 
the consideration of the factuality of extraordinary inner experiences such as ecstasy 
and their often beneficial biographical effects. 
The value of psycho-theological theories of ecstasy
I have previously called this set of theories “psycho-theological”33. This term is little 
bit bulky, but makes the point that all these theories are concerned with the inner side 
of phenomena such as ecstasy, and because of their depth or intensity they have tra-
ditionally been attributed to theology, and that no principal distinction can or should 
be drawn between them. In a different, more secular framework they are dealt with 
in psychology. What Teresa does is not much different from what the psychologists 
James or Maslow or the psychiatrists Schüttler34 or Spoerri35 do: phenomenologi-
cally describing extraordinary and sometimes extremely pleasurable or beneficial 
experiences and thinking about how they can be cultivated and best made use of. 
Except that Teresa was a Catholic woman of 16th-century Spain and expressed herself 
in the language of that time and place36. But these descriptions nevertheless remain 
important for psychology. The conjunction of “psychological” and “theological” into 
“psycho-theological” therefore indicates that (even if only in theorising altered states 
27 Cf. ibidem, p. 984.
28 Cf. ibidem, p. 985.
29 Cf. ibidem, p. 991.
30 Cf. ibidem, p. 989 et seq.
31 Cf. ibidem, p. 985.
32 “(...) que se ha mirado bien con advertencia”. Ibidem, p. 985.
33 See M. Deecke, op.cit.
34 G. Schüttler, Das mystisch-ekstatische Erlebnis. Systematische Darstellung der Phänomenologie 
und des psychopathologischen Aufbaus. Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde der Ho-
hen Medizinischen Fakultät der Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Bonn, 1968.
35 Beiträge zur Ekstase, T. Spoerri (ed.), Basel–New York 1968.
36 Of course this does not mean that the complicated interrelationship between language, experience, 
culture, and their reciprocative influences should be neglected.
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of consciousness, and here only applying to the good theories) theology and psychol-
ogy have very similar scopes. With their own good reasons these theories deliberately 
either neglect (Maslow, Teresa) or wholly deny (Buber) the importance of sociologi-
cal factors in theorising ecstasy. 
Preliminary contradictions and incommensurabilities37  
of sociological and psychological approaches
At this point of the argument we may conclude that there are at least two general 
types of diverging approaches to ecstasy that stand in sharp contrast to each other. 
Roughly speaking, so far:
– one type of theory explains ecstasy by connecting it exclusively to material 
and social interests (sociological and etic perspective)
– the other type explains ecstasy causally as an altered state of consciousness 
(individual and emic perspective).
These two approaches differ fundamentally from each other and are, so far, con-
tradictory: Either ecstasy and spirit possession are a by-product of the war of the 
sexes and clashes for power, disguising them under the convincing mimicry of re-
ligious, or they are a genuine psychological state in their own right with important 
potential for human development. These two opposing standpoints seem to go along 
the discursive lines which the cultural competitors of sociology of religion and phe-
nomenology of religion have long embraced. The sociological approach has a critical 
edge by undermining religion’s own assessments; the other tends to be favourable 
towards religion by trying to make it accessible for rational minds. The epistemo-
logical foundations they rely on come from the research traditions of positivism and 
hermeneutics. These are simplifications, but they are commonly used in the academic 
field, and help to understand many debates that have been going on in the academic 
study of religions. They are useful if they provide orientation by reducing some of the 
complexity but should not be overemphasised or reified. In his intriguing article Köp-
ping uses the same basic distinctions (applicable to the field of the study of religions) 
when he ascertains that to date there has been no “merging of theological theories 
37 One of the first to develop the notion of incommensurability (niewspółmierność) that was to be-
come so important for 20th-century epistemology was the Polish physician and epistemologist Ludwik 
Fleck (Cf. L. Schäfer, T. Schnelle, Ludwik Flecks Begründung der soziologischen Betrachtungsweise in 
der Wissenschaftstheorie [in:] L. Fleck, Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache. 
Einführung in die Lehre vom Denkstil und Denkkollektiv, Frankfurt am Main 1980, p. XXI). It is not used 
here to indicate methodological incommensurability betw een the subdisciplines such as sociology or psy-
chology of religion, but the taxonomic incommensurability that is used to describe different assignments 
of meanings to the same concept (in this case ecstasy) and therefore make the theories incommensurable 
(Cf.E. Oberheim, P. Hoyningen-Huene, The Incommensurability of Scientific Theories, The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E.N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/incom-
mensurability/ [accessed: 1.02.2013]).
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about mystic states and social-scientific categories”38. At the same time the acclaimed 
anthropologist seems to acknowledge that such coalescence is desirable. 
The question that remains to be answered is in which way these approaches are 
or are not commensurable with each other, and therefore if they really contradict 
each other on all levels. The commensurability that I would like to put into ques-
tion is not that of diverging methodologies of two disciplines (Lewis, for example, 
has acknowledged the convertibility of psychological and sociological explanations), 
which they have de facto acknowledged by competing with each other for the better 
explanation. When theorising ecstasy one has to ask: were they really talking about 
the same type of ecstasy, or did they (maybe intuitively or unconsciously) draw their 
material from wholly different backgrounds so that it can be grouped around different 
categories of ecstasy? Do their analyses possibly not only concern different aspects 
of the same phenomenon (social, individual), but refer to different phenomena, and 
are they therefore not contradictory but incommensurable?
What I would like to do in the next article is to make a suggestion for an inter-
pretative framework that will try to solve these questions. This will be attempted 
by integrating the different strands of research in the academic study of religions 
into a greater whole and assigning their scopes to similar, but eventually different 
phenomena. They therefore turn not out to be contradictory, but rather incommensu-
rable, since they apply to different types of phenomena. Their incommensurability, 
however, leads not to entire detachment from each other and a split into different 
fields, but to different perspectives and scopes within the same field of the academic 
study of religions. The aim is therefore to help to close futile debates and promote 
tolerance and plurality within its own ranks by establishing it as a diverse but unified 
discipline. Accordingly, it will attract more interested readers since it is more flexible 
and capable of answering a wider array of questions.
38 K.-P. Köpping, Ekstase [in:] Vom Menschen. Handbuch historische Anthropologie, Ch. Wulf (ed.), 
Weinheim–Basel 1997, p. 548–568, p. 551. Further problems that he sees are (1) the difficulties in trans-
forming the indigenous metaphors saturated by experience (Erlebnisbilder) into analytical, scientific 
categories, guaranteeing the intersubjective adequacy of the system of concepts; (2) the differentiation 
between true and false “madness”, or ecstasy (ibidem, p. 551). Whereas an approximation to solving the 
latter can be achieved by different hermeneutical methods (e.g. analysis of narrations as developed by 
Fritz Schütze, Magdeburg), the former remains a very difficult and as yet unaccomplished task.
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